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Abstract.
The roˆle of observers and observations in physics theories is considered in the light
of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. Incompleteness arises in Go¨del’s theorem with
self-referential propositions, when the system asks to define itself in its own terms.
Self-referencing occurs in physics whenever the observer is recognized as being part of
the observed system, so the acts of observation are also observables and should become
part of the phenomena considered by the theory. This is emphasized by the fact that
in many instances the same physical phenomenon may be viewed in more than one
way, hence its interpretation depends on the mode of observation.
Observations of observations imply a potentially endless hierarchy of levels of
observations. Each higher level suggests a larger overview with more profound insight
into the universe, empirically implying essentially new discoveries and realizations.
New discoveries imply new first principles in the foundation of the theory, so the
theory remains open and cannot be complete.
Keywords : observers and observations; self-referencing; self-negation; Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem; logical paradoxes; theory of everything; participating universe
“A human is the universe’s way of knowing the universe”
Anonymous
Any scientist is, first of all, a human being, acting as a scientist as part of the human
mission.
1. Introduction
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [1, 2, 3, 4] implies that any formal structure, based on
a finite number of first principles and inference rules, which is broad enough, cannot be
at the same time both consistent and complete – there can always be propositions, well
formulated within the theory, that are undecidable. Go¨del’s theorem concerns arithmetics
and logic, but since physical theories use mathematics and are organized as formal
structures then naturally comes the question: Does Go¨del’s theorem apply to physics?
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The significance to physics is tremendous. Completeness, in terms of physical
theories, implies determinism – if the necessary initial data are given then the state of a
physical system can be predicted any time in the future. But if Go¨del’s theorem applies
to physics, then the relevant theory cannot be deterministic or complete.
Classical physics and relativity are deterministic. But the broader the domain
a theory encompasses then the more it is apt to satisfy the conditions of Go¨del’s
theorem. Therefore, the natural candidate here is the so called ”ultimate universal
theory” or ”theory of everything” (TOE) – a finite, deterministic, complete, theory,
that is expected to account, via few and simple first principles and inference rules, for
all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be observed. The belief that it
is possible to eventually arrive at such a theory has been, for many years and for most
researches, a fundamental tenet of the scientific research, the wish and aspiration of
many scientists. But if Go¨del’s theorem applies to physics then such a theory is simply
impossible.
An early argument in favour of applying Go¨del’s theorem to physics claims that
“Go¨del’s theorem applies to arithmetics which is the basis of mathematics, physics uses
mathematics, therefore Go¨del’s theorem applies to physics” [5, 6]. On the other hand,
a common counter-argument is that while Go¨del’s theorem applies to the full extent of
arithmetics, there are mathematical branches to which it does not apply, e.g. geometry
[4], and that this is the type of mathematics that physics uses. Therefore we should not
expect that Go¨del’s theorem applies to physics [7, 8, 9].
However, close inspection of Go¨del’s theorem reveals that the core principle it
relies upon is self-reference[10]: If self-reference is possible then there can always be
well formulated propositions that are undecidable – cannot be proven or refuted. These
undecidable propositions are characterized by self-negation, appearing when the system
asks to define itself negatively in its own terms (in other words – refute itself), leading
to logical conflicts and paradoxes in a manner similar to the liar paradox or Russel’s
paradox [11]. Not all self-referencing is paradoxical, and not all negation is paradoxical,
but self-referencing allows paradoxical self-negation.
The present article proposes that self-reference is the decisive component of Go¨del’s
theorem where physics is concerned. When it exists or when it is possible it indicates
incompleteness. Focusing on referencing and self-referencing liberates us from the
mathematical argument – it is not important any more what kinds of mathematics
are used by physics.
Self-reference is found in physics when we realize that observers and observations
are participating in physical phenomena. In classical physics, till the end of 19th century,
the common view was that the human-observer-scientist is a separated, not involved,
by-standing witness to all universal phenomena. But 20th century physics made us
realize that in many instances the observer is capable of influencing the outcome of
experiments. Therefore, the observer should be recognized as a full participant, an
integral part of the observed system, with the acts of observation being also observables
that should become part of the phenomena considered by the theory. Observation is
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kind of referencing, therefore self-referencing occurs in physics whenever the observer
and the observation are also part of the observed system.
The applicability of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem to physics was initially
discussed along these lines in a recent publication [12]. The purpose of the present
article is to further the study of the roˆle of referencing and self-referencing in physics.
The questions that the article follows are ”How to describe referencing in physics?
Does it lead to incompleteness?”
We start by discussing referencing and self-referencing, first in principle, following
Go¨del’s theorem, then in physics and the theories formed from our observation of the
universe.
It is argued that in physics self-reference is like self-testimony, with observers
observing their own act of observation. Moreover – in many instances the same
physical phenomenon may be viewed in more than one way, so that the mode of the
observation determines its consequences. Self-reference and referencing in observations
lead to identifying levels of observation, between observer and observations. Each level
of observation requires a higher one for the former to be observed, thus creating a
(potentially infinite) hierarchy of levels of observation.
Observations are followed by interpretations, therefore each higher level suggests
a more profound insight which empirically implies an essentially new discovery, and
together a potentially infinite hierarchy of levels of interpretation. New discoveries
imply new first principles in the foundation of the theory, so the theory remains open
and cannot be complete.
2. Observations, consistency and completeness in physical theories
Let X be the space, realm, of all physical observables – all the physical phenomena in the
whole universe, from sub-atomic particles via rocks and oceans to galaxies and clusters
of galaxies, not only the objects but including all the processes and interactions, from
atomic and molecular configurations via rains and hurricanes to dynamics of galaxies.
The result of an observation depends upon the point of view (e.g., a reference frame)
from which we choose to perform the observation, and in many instances also upon
the way we choose to interpret it. Let a denote a typical point of view from which we
observe such phenomena, and let A be the sum-total of all the possible points of view,
A = {a}. An observation is an act from some point of view a ∈ A to some physical
phenomenon x ∈ X , which we denote in the following a↘ x.
According to the accepted scientific paradigm, the highlight of scientific research is
the ability to summarize the results of the study in a finite set of insights, as simple as
possible, that will explain familiar phenomena and predict related phenomena that have
not yet been observed. A physical theory is therefore a statement about the totality of
our observations of the physical world, {a↘ x}.
The expectation is that it is possible to identify in this totality of observations
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common fundamental principles that can be grasped by human cognition. These
fundamental principles stand as axioms at the basis of scientific theory, and from
them are deduced properties, statements and conclusions corresponding to the object
of the research. The combination of logical inferences with the results of observations
makes it possible to examine the correctness of the basic principles that have been
identified as the foundation of the theory.
Two essential characteristics are expected from any physical theory – consistency
and completeness, both logically and physically:
• Logical consistency – the theory does not produce conflicting predictions.
• Physical consistency the theory does not produce predictions that contradict
physical observations.
• Logical completeness all the predictions of the theory are uniquely concludable.
• Physical completeness given initial data, the future can be predicted with any
desired accuracy.
The last feature is the requirement of determinism.
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem casts doubt on the possibility of the existence
together of these characteristics for sufficiently broad physical theories.
3. Referencing and self-referencing
The crux of Go¨del’s proof is the ability to formulate, in arithmetic terms, a formula
G that says “G cannot be proven”. Such a definition may look very odd, due to its
circularity, but Go¨del managed to cast it in precise arithmetic context, so it can get a
numerical value. The sentence “G cannot be proven” is about arithmetics (since G is
an arithmetic formula) so G is also a meta-arithmetic formula, and since it refers back
to G it is self-referential. The self-negation in G is reminiscent of the self-negation in
logical paradoxes such as the liar paradox or Russel’s paradox, and similarly G is an
undecidable arithmetic formula, demonstrating that arithmetics is incomplete.
Self-negation is possible when referencing and self-referencing are possible. Let us
use an analogy to illustrate and clarify referencing vs. self-referencing. Imagine a group
of children playing in the yard. Then an adult calls them from a balcony, which is some
meters above the yard. The height difference puts the balcony position at superiority
relative to the yard level. If arithmetic statements are like the children playing in the
yard, then meta-arithmetic statements are like the adult calling from the balcony. This
is reference. Go¨del’s theorem deals with the meta-arithmetic statement in arithmetic
terms, which is like the balcony being in the yard’s level, so that both children and adult
may now refer to each other on the same footing. This is self-reference.
Referencing and self-referencing may be formally represented as follows. The
analogy above suggests introducing the concept of reference levels, with the relative
status of referrer level and referent level. Let a denote the referent and b denote the
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referrer, with a unidirectional reference relation b↘ a between them (we use the same
notation as for observations above because, as is argued in the following, an observation
is an act of reference). If the two levels – referrer level and referent level – are distinct,
than the referrer level may be regarded as higher or superior (‘balcony’) to the referent
level (‘yard’). This is just referencing. But if referrer and referent levels are not
distinguished then referencing is possible in both directions, b ↘ a and a ↘ b, and
that is self-referencing.
For instance, a may be some statement S while b is a statement about S, as
in Go¨del’s theorem. Or, examples corresponding to some logical paradoxes, e.g., “b
declares attribute a” (liar paradox) or “a is/isn’t a member of set b” (Russel’s paradox).
Also “b shaves/doesn’t shave a” (as in the barber paradox, see Appendix in [12]).
Self-referencing may also be demonstrated graphically, as in works of the Dutch artist
Escher†, in particular “Drawing hands” (Figure 1) with “b draws figure a”, manifesting
paradoxical self-referencing.
Figure 1. “Drawing Hands”
M.C. Escher (1948)
It is important to note that self-reference is a necessary condition for logical
paradoxes, but not sufficient. The children and the adult being in the same (yard)
level doesn’t necessarily mean that there’s a conflict. But if the adult calls the children
to end their playing and come home for dinner then a conflict is likely to occur. Similarly,
consider Russel’s paradox. Along the same lines we may create a set N which is “the
set of all sets that are members of themselves”. There is no paradox here. But if such
a construction is allowed, then negation may also be introduced and Russel’s paradox
ensues.
Consider, as another example, a space, or realm, of propositions {p}, and the
doublets:
(i) p ≡ ‘q is true’ q ≡ ‘p is true’
(ii) p ≡ ‘q is false’ q ≡ ‘p is false’
(iii) p ≡ ‘q is true’ q ≡ ‘p is false’
The building blocks (‘p is true’, etc.) are perfect logical statements in all three cases,
and each combination is self-referential. The first two are tautologies, even though (ii)
contains negation, while (iii) is paradoxical negation.
† M.C. Escher. His works can be found on the official website http://www.mcescher.com/ and on a
wide variety of other websites.
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It follows, therefore, that when we scan the whole spectrum of possibilities allowed
by self-referencing, self-negation may be found there as part of the possibilities – if
affirmation is possible, so is negation.
4. Participating observers and self-referencing
The principle of relativity manifests the fact that measurements are observer-dependent.
In quantum experiments, the way the experiment has been set up and the chosen mode
of observation may determine the outcome of the experiment – whether the observed
object is detected as a wave or a particle, or which path it follows in traveling from one
point to another, etc.. The mere act of observation may therefore influence the universe
at the most fundamental levels.
Hence the view, that a quantum measurement creates an actuality out of a mere
potentiality. Then it is not only the value of the measurement that is observer-
dependent, but the very nature of the empirical end-result. Then the observer is
not a by-stander, uninvolved, separated witness of physical phenomena but an active
participant involved in the occurrence of physical experience. The mode of observation
– arbitrarily chosen by the observer – determines, even in small, the way the universe
evolves.
When the act of observation, being influential in physical phenomena, becomes an
integral part of the phenomenon, then with it, necessarily, also the human observers,
which become participating observers. When the observer, the observation and the
subject all are part of the physical phenomena, this is a manifestation of self-reference
(Figure 2).
Figure 2. Self-reference in physics: the observer, the observation and the subject all
are part of the physical phenomena
In the following sections we explore referencing observations, first in principle and
then in current physics.
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5. Observers, observations and referencing
In arithmetics, Go¨del’s theorem demonstrates that the possibility of self-referencing –
arithmetic statements that are also meta-arithmetic – allows paradoxical self-negation
which in turn implies undecidability, and therefore incompleteness. In physics, so far, we
don’t have such physical-metaphysical statements or formulae. However, we observe the
universe, then construct theories of physics from the interpretation of our observations.
These observations are like the referencing in Go¨del’s theorem.
To consider the observation processes, let us start, as an indicative example, with
the drawing known as “Rubin’s vase” (Figure 3). The first thing to notice and emphasize
is the fact that the same drawing may be interpreted in more than one way, and the
mode of interpretation depends entirely on our choice: If we focus our mind on the
white area we see a cup; but if we focus our mind on the black area we see two faces.
We can even switch our attention from the black to the white area, and back, thus
skipping between cup and faces. Here the drawing is the subject, or referent, and the
state of mind which focuses on either the white or black areas is the referrer level. But
then, there is a higher state of mind that monitors our observation of the drawing and
appreciates both options. This higher state of mind is a referrer level for the state of
mind which sees either the cup or the faces, which in this relation becomes the referent.
Figure 3. Rubin’s vase: Cup or faces?
Similarly, consider Escher’s “Drawing hands” (Figure 1). In first-level observations
we see (focus on) either one hand or the other as the drawing hand but not both together
because that will arouse a conflict. This (first level) state of mind is here the referrer
while the hands are the referent, but then we may observe, from a higher state of mind,
both hands as drawing each other. Here this higher state of mind is the referrer level,
while the separate observations of the single hands are in the referent level.
Formally we may proceed as follows. Following the notation introduced previously,
let x ∈ X be a physical object or phenomenon, the subject of observation (more precisely,
the image of the subject of observation in the observer’s mind). Let a ∈ A be the
point of view of the observer while observing x, with a ↘ x denoting the act of
observation. A = {a} is then the totality of points of view for direct observation of
physical phenomena.
With the observer being also part of the universe, the act of observation becomes an
observable phenomenon. Observers (necessarily human) have the ability to observe their
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own process of observation. Then the observer can develop another, higher or superior,
point of view, b, from which he observes a↘ x. So now we also have b↘ (a↘ x), with
B = {b↘ (a↘ x) |a ∈ A} the totality of observations of A-level observations. Level
A is referrer level for X , but referent level for B.
Hence, for Escher’s “Drawing hands” (Figure 1), while A-level viewing sees each of
the hands either as drawing or as being drawn, B-level viewing sees both hands together,
drawing and being drawn: Let a1 be viewing the right hand drawing the left hand and
a2 be viewing the left hand drawing the right hand. Then, with x being the drawing
itself, the B-level viewing is b↘ {a1 ↘ x, a2 ↘ x}.
Similarly, for “Rubin’s vase” (Figure 3), with a1 being focusing at the white area
(cup) and a2 being focusing at the black area (faces), and x being the drawing itself,
A-level viewings {a1 ↘ x, a2 ↘ x} are seeing either the cup or the faces, while B-level
viewing b↘ {a1 ↘ x, a2 ↘ x} is seeing both at the same time (monitoring the possible
switching of our focusing between the two).
Another example is the well-known story of the elephant in the village of blind
people: The elephant itself is the subject x. It is the referent for the blind persons,
each touching a different member of the elephant’s body, being at different positions in
level A which for them is the referrer level. But the wise man, who understands that
they have touched different members of the same elephant, he is in level B which is the
referrer level relative to the villagers.
There may be more than just two reference levels in observation: From any level
of observation it is possible to observe only lower-order observations, not its own
observations. Hence, using short-hand notation A ↘ x for “observing a phenomenon
x from some point of view in A”, etc., then from B it is possible to observe A ↘ x,
i.e., B ↘ (A ↘ x), but B ↘ (A ↘ x) itself cannot be observed from B. Still, the
observer may develop a higher-order level of view C from which it is possible to observe
B ↘ (A ↘ x); namely, C ↘ (B ↘ (A ↘ x)) is possible, etc..
6. Referencing observations in physics
An observation is our interpretation of some input into our mind and consciousness‡.
No matter which devices and how many are used for measurement and registration, at
the end it is human interpretation. Science is the end result that we make of these
interpretations.
“Rubin’s vase” (Figure 3) is a simple graphical illustration: The drawing itself is
just raw data – a set of pixels. When these pixels enter our mind, their interpretation
depends on what we choose to focus upon – the black or the white area.
Classical physics corresponds to the base level of observation – direct observations
‡ Mind and consciousness are meant here, in a broad sense, as the domain where mental processes take
place and we interpret our experiences, whether internal or external, and find meaning and significance
for them.
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of physical phenomena, corresponding to level A in the notation above. A characteristic
of the classical level is localizability (local reality) – it can only accept that any object
can be at any moment in only one place, or that a physical system can be in only
one, definite, state, defined by the detecting devices. A-level observations A ↘ x are
confined to detecting either particle-like properties or wave-like properties, because
these are detectable observables. This corresponds to viewing each of the hands in
Figure 1 either as drawing or as being drawn, and to viewing either the cup or the
faces in Figure 3. Classical physics theories thus refer to A-level observations only,
{A ↘ x}, uniquely determined by the system or method of detection.
Quantum mechanics manifests non-localizability. The classically educated mind,
demanding localizability and confined to A-level observations only, cannot accept
non-localizability. But many quantum delayed-choice experiments indicate, quite
convincingly, that a photon is wave-particle – an entity that combines both properties
but is neither this nor that exclusively – and it is only the nature of the detection device
that exposes either the wave or particle aspect [13].
Non-localizability necessarily introduces higher levels of observation: A higher-
than-A level is needed to be able to appreciate that a physical entity can be
simultaneously in two or several places or in more than one state (in the classical
sense); e.g., a photon being wave-particle. This is very much like seeing both hands
simultaneously drawing and being drawn in Figure 1, or observing that we can see
both cup and faces in Figure 3, as from level B above. While the subjects of A-level
observations (A ↘ x) are directly detectable physical phenomena, the subjects of B-
level observations are the A ↘ x observations themselves. The understanding that we
can arbitrarily choose between detecting the photon as a particle and detecting as a
wave is a B-level appreciation. Therefore, the base A ↘ x observations become also
observables – they become participating observations – and higher, B-level observations
B ↘ (A ↘ x) are necessarily involved.
Moreover – recent delayed-choice experiments reviewed in [13] indicate that even the
distinction between ‘entanglement’ and ‘separability’ depends on the detecting device
and is not an essential characteristic of a physical system. This distinction is an
appreciation of B-level observations, therefore has to be a C-level observation, namely
C ↘ (B ↘ (A ↘ x)), following the notation of the previous section.
Classical physics realizes only A-level observations, of physically detectable
phenomena. New empirical (quantum mechanical) evidence, unexplainable by classical
physics, led to realization of B-level observations. While these B-level observations –
observations of observations, of the kind B ↘ (A ↘ x) – are recognized empirically,
they are not accounted for, so far, theoretically. Physics theories don’t know yet how
to include observers and observations and how to refer to participating observations
A ↘ x as part of the subject matter.
The higher B-level observations {B ↘ (A ↘ x)} call for insights and understand-
ings above and beyond the lower A-level observations {A ↘ x}, and these have to be
part of a new, futuristic theory. To successfully account for quantum phenomena the
Observers and observations in physics theories 10
theory must refer explicitly to (at least) two-stage processes of observation, i.e., to
the totality of {B ↘ (A ↘ x)}§ (this also explains why local hidden variables meth-
ods couldn’t succeed to explain quantum mechanics – such methods are classical-like,
A-level methods).
Similarly, new empirical evidence regarding B-level observations, such as the non-
essentiality of the distinction between ‘entanglement’ and ‘separability’, call for new
insights and understandings above and beyond the B-level understandings, which are
then contained in C-level understandings.
Another feature of classical physics is time-symmetry. Classical physics, with A-
level observations, cannot account for the arrow of time, neither in thermodynamics nor
in electrodynamics or cosmology. The observation of time-asymmetry is therefore at
least B-level – the arrow of time is certainly observed, but cannot be accounted for by
current physics theories.
7. Hierarchies of observation levels and physical incompleteness
The preceding sections explain the levels of observation and how they relate to one
another. Recalling that observation is a unidirectional act, from observer to observed, we
may distinguish between the referrer (observer) and referent (observed) levels, putting
the former at superiority relative to the latter. Hence, in observing the universe
we construct hierarchies of observation levels (points or levels of view). Since from
an observation level it is possible to observe lower-order observation levels, these are
reference levels.
As discussed above, we currently experience in physics only very few levels of
observation – A-level, B-level, and possibly start of C-level observations. But when
a new phenomenon is observed that the current theory cannot explain, we seek for new
first principles that cover these new observations. Therefore, in principle at least, this
process of new higher level observations referring to lower level observations can go on
and on (or up and up), without limit.
Each level in the hierarchy of observation levels necessarily contains insights and
understandings regarding the levels below. With each level adding some insights and
understandings that are not contained in the levels below, the unlimited hierarchy
of observation levels cannot be summed up with a finite number of insights and
understandings – thus inevitably implying incompleteness.
Indeed, in Go¨del’s proof, for any finite set of first principles and inference rules
there exist some undecidable statements. These statements may become provable
(or refutable) by adding new axioms, or first principles, but then new undecidable
statements ensue. A finite set of axioms will never be enough to make the theory
complete – a never-ending series, or hierarchy, of new axioms is required, which is
§ See also Zwick [16] for a two-stage proposition for quantum measurement. He ignores, though, the
roˆle of the observer in the process.
Observers and observations in physics theories 11
essentially the incompleteness. It is by such a hierarchy that paradoxical self-negation
is circumvented.
Generally we are not aware of the distinction between levels of observation in daily
life. In a way, it is like looking at a photograph of some panoramic landscape. By taking
the photo we actually squeeze a 3D source into a 2D result. The photograph doesn’t
distinguish between different depths – in the photo they are all the same level. It is
only that we, with our experience and knowledge of the laws of perspective, distinguish
between close and distant when we look at the photograph. This distinction occurs
wholly in our minds.
It is the same with any image that we form in our mind regarding the universe –
we can see it squeezed, no hierarchical levels, or, alternatively, we can see and identify
the hierarchies and the levels of which they are constructed.
Therefore, when the distinction between levels is ignored, we get a picture in which
everything – the contents of all the levels – is squeezed into just one common level. This
naive situation is illustrated in Figure 2. Then we encounter self-referencing, and logical
paradoxes (as in the liar paradox, Russel’s paradox, etc.) occur.
Self-reference is therefore an indication for squeezing separate levels into one.
Paradoxes are indications of misconceptions, and self-reference paradoxes appear when
levels that should be separated are instead squeezed (in our mind) into just one common
level.
8. Concluding remarks
For millennia humans wish to unlock and decipher the secrets of the universe, including
also our human part in it. If the universe is the realm where everything happens, then
we, humans, are part of the big happening. Not only with our physical body, but with
the whole of us, and that includes our mind and consciousness as well.
This is important because our observations and their interpretations, from which
science is formed, they all take place within our mind and consciousness. Inquiries,
whether regarding a particular phenomenon or the entire universe, decisions regarding
how to perform an experiment and the mode of observation, and the interpretation of
our observations and impressions, all take place within the realm of our consciousness.
We are all, with our consciousness, part of the universe, and we observe and inquire the
universe and our part in it from and within our consciousness. Therefore, questions
regarding the universe are asked from within it, and any theory that aspires to
encompass the whole universe, with all the phenomena in Nature, is the universe, via
our consciousness, inquiring itself.
The idea that the observers are active participants in the evolution of the universe
is certainly not new, and was proposed and acknowledged by many. J.A. Wheeler,
for instance, a prominent proponent of this idea, suggested a series of delayed-choice
experiments (as mentioned above) to corroborate it [13, 14, 15].
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It is important to emphasize, though, that we don’t propose here that the universe
evolves only when humans observe and inquire in and upon it. On the contrary –
the universe evolved for a very-very long time without the presence of humans. Only
after the earth reached a sufficiently evolved state it could sustain homo sapiens which
started inquiring. We cannot also exclude the possibility of existence of other intelligent
beings somewhere else in the universe, also inquiring it and participating in its evolution.
With the big-bang a huge amount of power was unleashed, which has been since then
the moving force for the evolution of the universe. We, humans, are expressions of this
moving power, and inquiring the universe is part of our human mission. Homo sapiens
– the inquiring human – allows the universe to be aware of itself.
While Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem deals with arithmetics and logic, it served
here as a guide for possible implications to physics and the natural sciences. The prime
feature of the theorem is that self-referencing allows paradoxical self-negation, which
implies incompleteness.
In wishing to encompass the entire universe by the natural sciences, we have
to realize that observers and observations should be included as observables, part of
the subject-matter of the theory, thereby introducing self-referencing into the theory.
The self-referencing may be circumvented by recognizing the hierarchy of levels of
observations, as discussed in previous sections, but nevertheless incompleteness ensues
due to the endless hierarchy; and in physics incompleteness implies non-determinism –
there are processes whose outcome cannot be predicted by the theory, at least not fully.
The persuasion in the existence of a ‘theory of everything’, with a finite set of
fundamental principles, has been for many years part of the central paradigm of science,
and physics in particular. The expectation for a finite TOE rests on the ancient belief
that the universe is fixed and eternal. But modern physics demonstrates that some
empirical results are observer-dependent, so that our inquiries and observations affect
the evolution of the universe. Therefore the universe does not follow a fixed plan, but
constantly evolves openly, with always the possibility of appearance of essentially new
phenomena, unexplainable by former theories, with new discoveries that offer new first
principles. Hence non-determinism – the future may be predicted only in a limited way.
The virtue of Go¨del’s proof is in the success to express meta-arithmetic statements
in arithmetic terms, explicitly manifesting self-reference. In physics observations
suggest self-reference, but so far we don’t have self-referencing meta-physical statements
expressed in physical terms. While observers and observations appear a lot in discussions
by and among physicists in interpretations of theoretical and experimental results, the
observers and their observations themselves are not yet part of physics theories as
references and self-references. It is our strong belief that the next breakthrough or
‘quantum leap’ in physics must involve meta-physical statements connecting observers
and observations as an integral part of the theory.
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